Abstract: Thermal unit operating constraints, hydro spill conditions, must-take resources and inflexible demand can all contribute to an electric power system's minimum load, or "backdown," problem's severity. We present two approaches to addressing minimum load constraints in the unit commitment problem. The first, traditional approach is to perform a unit commitment without considering the minimum load constraints, and then make the solution feasible by applying a predetermined "non-economic" backdown order to curtail must-take resources. The second approach considers minimum load constraints as system constraints similar to operating capacity constraints, and characterizes resources to be backed as having both a decremental cost and an incremental value to the system, where these are not necessarily equal and so impact the decision to make economy sales or pump with pumped-storage resources '
I. INTRODUCTION
As in the case of production of any other good, the shortage of supply for meeting demand is what gives the production of electricity positive economic value, and indeed is what makes electric utilities (at least potentially) profitable businesses. However, the very limited capability of consumers or producers to store electricity gives it a quality of extreme perishability which can result in periods of supply exceeding demand, known in the industry as "minimum load" periods because the minimum loading of supply resources exceeds customer demand.
The difficulties of dumping excess production are greater in electric supply than in, say, agriculture because the electric network's stability requires an exact match of supply PE-168-PVVRS-0-1-1998 A paper recommended and approved by the lEEE Power System Operations Committee of the lEEE Power Engineering Society for publication in the IEEE Transadions on Power Systems. Manuscript submitted March 28, 1997; made available for printing January 16, 1998 and demand at any given instant. Under normal operating conditions, a "regulating margin" is maintained on flexible resources so that load can always be reduced or increased on an instantaneous basis. Under minimum load conditions, however, the regulating margin is not sufficient to correct the excess of supply over demand, and the utility must curtail inflexible supply.
The subject of this paper is the determination of how best to curtail, or "back down," supply during periods of minimum load.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we describe the factors which make the minimum load problem a significant one at Pacific Gas and Electric Co. under an integrated utility framework of resource scheduling. In section 3 we present an initial formulation of the short-term resource scheduling problem assuming the integrated utility framework. In section 4 we describe a traditional approach to backdown, in which minimum load is addressed through postprocessing of this formulation's solution. In section 5 we then describe a more economically based approach, which requires that a value be placed on backdown (in the form of possibly distinct incremental and decremental costs) so that it can be coordinated with the overall cost minimization performed in scheduling the system. We believe the latter approach is more amenable to use under restructuring when both a power exchange and an independent system operator will be evaluating backdown options. In section 6 we present simulation results to illustrate the differences between the two approaches, and in section 7 we conclude with remarks on the implications of electric industry restructuring in California for reformulation and new approaches to solution of the minimum load problem.
THE MINIMUM LOAD PROBLEM
Minimum load conditions in the PG&E system are caused by four distinct sources of operational inflexibility. First, PG&E thermal generating units, which are used to follow load during peak hours, have as a matter of operating policy minimum down times ranging from 24 to 72 hours. Minimum down time, the time required between shutdown and subsequent startup of a unit, is set to avoid the wear-and-tear on the unit caused by too-frequent cycling, and to assure sufficient capacity in the system during peak hours (if a unit is shut down, aside from long-term stress there is also a nonnegligible probability that the unit will be unable to start up again according to schedule). Thus, thermal units must remain 0885-8950/99/$10.00 0 1998 IEEE committed during off-peak periods when minimum load may occur, to be available during on-peak periods. But when a thermal unit is committed, it must be run at or above a nonzero minimum loading level, resulting in the possibility of supply exceeding demand. This potential source of minimum load has previously been discussed as a major operational concern in performing thermal unit commitment [l] . The degree to which minimum up and down times should be treated as hard physical constraints should receive more is a subject which should receive more attention in the competitive electric market.
A second source of operational inflexibility in the PG&E system is run-of-river hydro generation. During the seasons of maximum runoff, PG&E has no choice but to operate run-of-river hydro at full load. The only alternative, "spilling" water (Le., releasing water downstream without using it for generation) is both wasteful in foregoing an essentially cost-free resource, and may be subject to environmental stream flow restrictions.
Besides run-of-river hydro, other inflexible resources in the PG&E system include PG&E-owned nuclear generation; geothermal units, which are for the most part highly dispatchable but may be constrained to a minimum take by the characteristics of the steam field); and non-PG&E Qualifying Facilities. These resources are part of a "backdown order" which allows curtailmeint of inflexible generation when all PG&E thermal units are at minimum load and the only other way of reducing generaition is to spill hydro. It is this third source of operational inflexibility, the resources in PG&E's backdown order, whose curtailments are to be modeled in this paper.
A fourth sourc~: of operational inflexibility is to be found on the other side of the supply-demand imbalance. Customer demand cannot in general respond to minimum load conditions. Ideally, wider some form of real-time pricing some customers would be able to take advantage of ultra-low incentive prices during minimum load periods to increase their demands, with the same beneficial effects as supply curtailments. Obstacles to this ideal include technical communications requircments and lack of customer workprocess flexibility.
On the other hmd, PG&E may have a more realistic option for increasing demand under minimum load conditions, namely sales to other utilities outside of its control area. These sales are presumably undertaken at a "loss," in terms of the average costs of energy production, and these losses may be taken as the real opportunity costs of not backing down for PG&E. On the other hand, there are always uncertainties associated with sales to unidentified other utilities. And even when it may be possible to make a sale with sufficient notice, the longer term consequences of depressing market prices need to be considered by the planner. Other sources of operational flexibility may include combustion turbine use or energy purchases during on-peak periods to reduce the need for units with long minimum up times, and use of pump storage to increase the effective load during minimum load periods.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the resource scheduling problem of minimizing resource operating costs subject to satisfaction of supply-demand balance and reliability-related reserve or capacity constraints. The problem may be written as follows:
., T (3)
In this formulation, we denote resource i's commitment state in period t by x, t, and its generation level in that period by pIt . ult is the function which has value 1 when unit i is on in period t, and is 0 otherwise. s,, (,) is the startup cost function, and c,,(,) is the generation cost function.
Constraint set (2) is the supply demand balance constraint, with D, being the demand forecasted in period t. Constraint set (3) represents the spinning reserve requirements, with R, representing unit i's contribution to spinning capacity in period t, and RFq being the reserve requirement in period t. Minimum load conditions exists in period t when the constraint that
is violated, where p,ml" is unit i's minimum operating level in period t. A Lagrangian relaxation algorithm, which solves a dual of problem (P), is used in PG&E's Hydro-Thermal Optimization program to obtain a near-optimal resource schedule. This algorithm, which has been described in some detail in earlier papers [2-41, effectively puts "prices" or values (the Lagrange multipliers) on satisfying the unsatisfied constraints and updates these prices in such a way that the dual solution is both near-optimal and close to being a feasible solution to the primal problem (P). Strict feasibility is obtained by further price perturbations in periods of constraint violation, which moves the associated dual solution away (but not too far away) from optimality.
IV. MODELING OF BACKDOWN CONSTRAINTS
Minimum load conditions in the strictest sense are indicated when no feasible solution to (P) exists due to violations of constraint (4). Under these conditions, and assuming that the right-hand sides of the violated constraints (i.e., the values of the DJ cannot be modified, the only way to obtain a feasible schedule is to modifi enough values in the set of operating minimums { p ,~ } to obtain c, ,tman * u ,~ < D~ and the corresponding feasible dispatch xi ,pin = D,,
The operating minimums of thermal generating units are assumed to be physical limits that cannot be modified, and it is assumed that hydro energy production can only be reduced in a given hour by spilling water. What remains is the set of manually scheduled resources identified at PG&E as being in the %on-economic backdown order," and the operating minimums of these resources can only be reduced according to a predetermined priority order.
In traditional approaches to backdown, the true costs of backing down fixed resources may be (1) not represented at all in the initial resource scheduling problem, and only assigned in a post-processing phase to be used in solving an "optimal decommitment" problem [S-71; or (2) represented only approximately and in terms of threshold levels at which operators must consider backdown.
According to the strict definition, minimum load conditions must indicate that no feasible commitment not including involuntary backdown exists. Lagrangian relaxation based algorithms do not in general guarantee that, when no feasible solution is found, no feasible solution exists. However, when values of the Lagrange multipliers become "pathological" (i.e., move toward infinity or negative infiity) it is at least an indication that the algorithm will not be able to find a feasible solution, and that (interpreting the multipliers as price signals) no "reasonable" feasible solution exists.
In the infeasible case, the simplest approach to backdown is to take an infeasible solution obtained as the end point of the original scheduling algorithm's search (a "nearfeasible" commitment, it may be hoped), and to allocate the infeasibilities according to the predetermined backdown priority order. However, this approach is actually solving a modified version of the original scheduling problem, and thus there may be some question as to what proper combination of minimum cost and minimum infeasibility should be the scheduler's modified objective function.
If there is no explicit penalty for backdown, the modified problem formulation simply replaces the strict load balance constraint with an inequality:
The addition of a penalty for backdown infeasibility can be accomplished in several different ways. The load balance constraint itself enforces backdown feasibility, so a penalty for backdown can be introduced by allowing the multipliers on this constraint (the "marginal energy values") to take negative values. Alternatively, the load balance constraint may be split into two constraints, the first being (2) or (PI), and the second (P2) is an explicit minimum capacity constraint, and by including it the multiplier on load balance can be kept nonnegative. These approaches work well when a feasible schedule exists and the amount of excess production under the relaxed formulation (Pl) would be relatively small.
In general, however, these approaches by themselves have convergence problems and do not capture the nonlinear nature of penalties on backdown. Because of these difficulties, we have combined the addition of a minimum capacity constraint with the creation in the input data set of a fictitious "backdown resource." This resource produces negative generation according to a cost function similar to those of actual generating units. The cost curve effectively represents backstop "fire sale" prices depending on the amount of backdown required. If no costs can be explicitly assigned to backdown (because limits on total backdown over a year put an additional premium on backdown, or because users are uncomfortable with making non-cost penalties explicit) we require that the upper limit on backdown costs, i.e. the marginal cost threshold at which the algorithm's multiplier updates will cause backdown to be scheduled, be lower than the marginal operating cost of any dispatchable unit. Then the marginal cost signal given by the final values of the Lagrange multipliers will clearly indicate periods of backdown.
Another alternative formulation treats minimum load conditions as analogous to capacity shortage conditions, to be avoided by adding a "backdown reserve" constraint to either (Pl) or (P2) having the form ci (Pit-Pi?)*Ult 2 BR, tz I, 2, ......., T (P3) where BRt is a backdown reserve requirement in period t. The effect of adding this constraint is to encourage units with more backing flexibility to commit over those with less. It should be noted that a feasible solution to the problem under this formulation will have some flexible units (e.g., conventional thermal generation) operating above their minimums even when the backdown resource is scheduled at nonzero levels. Such a solution goes counter to stated rules for taking backdown in the current regulatory environment, and has not been implemented at PG&E. However, this solution might provide much-needed real-time operating flexibility in the deregulated environment emerging in Califomia.
V. VALUE-BASED BACKDOWN
The backdown problem would be relatively easy to solve from the standpoint of short-term resource scheduling if minimum load conditions were indicated operationally only according to the strict sense. But in fact, minimum load conditions are considered to exist operationally whenever all committed PG&E thermal generation is at operating minimum.
This looser operational dLefinition implies that there may be interactions between the thermal unit commitment, which is determined so as to minimize operating costs over the whole short-term scheduling horizon, and the severity of minimum load conditions. The scheduling algorithm may in fact be able to find a feasible but unattractive solution. In this solution involuntary backdown of fixed schedule resources can be avoided by decommitting thermal units and using more expensive resources on-peak. When the algorithm produces this kind of solution to the backdown problem, system operators examine it closely. The solution inay be judged to not properly trade off the increase in overall costs due to decommitment against the costs or penalties of iiivoluntary backdown. Also, peaking resources tend to have inuch less operating flexibility than conventional thermal units, so that the apparently feasible solution might in fact be extremely sensitive to errors in the demand forecast.
However, in order to achieve an improved trade-off, backdown costs must be assessed with the same accuracy as other operating costs. Given such an assessment, backdown can be hlly integrated into the resource scheduling problem, resulting in a value-based approach to backdown.
Such an approach requires operator willingness to monetize both backdown costs and the market price for power (at least in the case of a highly interconnected utility like PG&E). a sale would be profitable considering incurred generation costs.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
An example will illustrate how the backdown order is defined, and the effects of explicitly specifying this order within the unit commitment, and of explicitly "optimizing backdown" --that is, explicitly including the backdown constraints in the unit commitment and associating negative multipliers with these constraints when violated Table 1 shows how the backdown order is defined for the test case. Under current minimum load protocols, a resource's capacity may be split into several blocks. Only one of these blocks may be backed down before backdown must proceed to another resource. The effect of this is to create successively lower minimum levels to which a resource may be backed, depending on how much backdown is needed. Resources in the backdown order have a cost of generation and a value of backdown associated with them. The cost is based on variable operating costs andor penalties for backing, and is used as an incremental cost in evaluating whether or not pumping should be taken by the pumped-storage resource. The value is defined as the minimum of the resource's cost and the value of the preceding resource in the backdown order, and is used as a monotonically decreasing decremental cost of backdown in the optimization. When no backdown order is explicitly defined, the unit commitment assumes an unlimited backdown resource available at a user-defined value (in the test case, $2" ) .
Value-based backdown costs continue to represent the decremental cost of backing down, as in the previous section where a fictitious "backdown resource" was used to represent desired backdown levels. Now, however, these costs are associated with the specific resources to be backed down and modeled as multiple backdown values. The resources' Additionally, a distinction may be made between the decremental backdown value and an incremental backdown cost, with the latter being used in evaluating any sales or pumped-storage pumping decisions within the scheduling program during minimum load periods. The effect of this is to cause the cost ascribed to an additional MW to depend on the "marginal" resource or resources being backed down. Pumping and sales use marginal energy prices, usually based on the Lagrange multiplier values, to determine the economics of their scheduling. The equating of Lagrange multipliers with prices is here taken literdly, even within the algorithm itself
The market price for power is represented within the scheduling model as a sale with large or even unlimited capacity, which is presumably priced below the level at which Figure 1 illustrates the effects of explicitly defining the backdown order, and of optimizing for backdown versus accounting for backdown only in terms of the supply-demand balance constraint. Explicit inclusion of backdown resources is seen to affect the amount of backdown taken only slightly, and it would seem that the primary benefit of such inclusion is in a more accurate accounting for the actual costs and benefits of backdown. Optimizing for backdown, on the other hand, significantly reduces both overall backdown taken and extreme values of backdown in individual hours. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of different backdown procedures on system lambdas. It will be seen that some effects of how backdown is done extend into the peak hours, and that off-peak lambdas serve as an indicator of the point in the backdown order reached in a backdown hour. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEREGULATION
We anticipate that the deregulated electric supply industry structure proposed for California will make it possible for generation owners to move away from "non-economic" approaches to scheduling backdown, since they can bid into a power pool in such a way as to maximize their profits without being subject to the obligation to serve. Under California's proposed electric industry restructuring, individual electricity production companies will bid into a power exchange, or PX, which matches scheduled supply and demand. An independent system operator, or ISO, will then be responsible for maintaining system security in real time, and will dispatch resources accordingly based on predetermined protocols.
The utilities' filings with the California Public Utility Commission on the restructuring of California's electric industry [8,9] recognize the fact that the operation of the power system in real-time will continue to be subject to periods of minimum load (termed "over-generation" in the filings) even under restructuring. The PX, in the process of matching supply and demand bids, determines marginal prices for scheduled generation in each hour on a day-ahead basis. In periods when supply exceeds demand due to supply inflexibility, the price paid to suppliers should decrease toward zero, as has in fact occurred in the British and Victoria (Australia) power pools. Thus, the PX will first have allowed its price for supply in over-generation periods to drop to zero, so that all resources bidding into the pool with a bid price greater than zero are rejected in these periods. Any remaining over-generation problem will then be addressed by directing electricity producers to curtail their generation according to a predefined weighting.
The filings with the CPUC propose protocols for dealing with over-generation during the transition period in which the major California utility companies as generation suppliers and as distribution companies are obligated to bid all of their supply and demand into the PX. It seems likely that these protocols will evolve in the direction of market mechanisms following the transition to a competitive market in which no supply or demand is obligated to bid into the pool (thus requiring the pool to offer competitive prices if it is to stay in business as an energy broker). It may for example be possible for a secondary market to develop for trading backdown curtailments, if resources like run-of-river hydro continue to bid zero into the post-transition PX. Note however that setting the marginal price for energy to zero provides a good signal to suppliers to increase their dispatchability if possible, and to customers to take advantage of the availability of zero-cost energy during certain hours. Thus many of the above factors contributing to minimum load should be alleviated over time given proper marginal value price signals.
From the standpoint of the electricity producer bidding into the pool, anticipation of minimum load conditions obviously affects bids. Resources which see no alternative to staying on-line will presumably bid zero in order to guarantee commitment as far as possible. Environmentally based spill constraints will presumably continue to be binding on hydro resources, but in cases where spill is not constrained environmentally, resources will be responsible for properly trading off forced spill against generation of power for which they are paid zero.
Of course, requirements for capital cost recovery may cause generators to commit in less than optimal ways, but assuming that prices offered for generation in minimum load periods go to zero, customers may take advantage of temporary opportunities to obtain virtually free energy, and most suppliers in turn should make strenuous efforts to improve the "fit" of their resource portfolios with actual demand, for example by reducing their minimum up and down times or by investing in more flexible cyding generation.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented several approaches to modifying short-term resource scheduling algorithms to model minimum load constraints and backdown of fixed-schedule resources. The most accurate representation includes an assessment of market conditions and a representation of both incremental and decremental costs of fixed resources under minimum load conditions.
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Discussion
A. Conejo (Universidad de Castilla -La Mancha, Ciudad Real, Spain), N. Jimknez Redondo, (Universidad de MBlaga, MBlaga, Spain): We would like to congratulate the authors for their relevant paper. They address minimum load constraints in a Lagrangian Relaxation framework arid provide an economical interpretation of multipliers associated to these constraints.
We would like to make the following remarks:
1. Constraints (a) below ((4) in the paper)
x P $ ' "~U i t < D t : a t ; t = l ; . . , T i.
enforce minimum load constraints. Multiplier at represents the marginal price to be paid to avoid "excess minimum output" power. Multiplier at is different from 0 and negative only when excess minimum output power arise. Multiplier at makes' it possible to distinguish among two units which are identical in everything but their respective niinirnum output powers. From a market point of view, these units constitute different generating offers. enforce the system capability of "regulating down" at any load (time). They provide load following capabilities (down) at any load (time), not only at periods with excess minimum output power. Multiplier [& represents the marginal price to be paid at hour t to have the ability to regulate down. In a market framework Pt will be in general different from 0 and positive at any load (time). Units on-line economically tend to produce either at maximum output power or at minimum output power unless reserve incentives exist.
We would appreciate answers to the questions below:
1. We believe that sets of constraints (a) and (b) represent different physical facts, provide different economical signals, and both sets of constraints should be included in a resource scheduling problem. They are not alternative sets of constraints. We would appreciate authors' opinion in the above respect.
2. It seems that the authors replace set of constraints (a) by set of constraints (b) to avoid convergence problems. Could they further explain the experienced convergence problems? Do they use a subgradient multiplier updating procedure, or do they use a more elaborate procedure such as a primal bundle method [A] or a dual bundle method [B] ?
3. Which set of constraints is considered for the case study? (a) or (b).
4. Could the authors clarify the correspondence of the four plots in Figure 2 with the proposed backdown procedures? Which one of these procedures results in minimum total operating cost'?
Finally, we would like to commend again the authors foI their relevant contribution.
